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Introduction
This paper explores the competitive threat posed by People's Republic of China (PRC) to Latin America and Caribbean (LAC). It focuses on the impact of PRC's rise as a major exporter of manufactures, but it also considers bilateral trade between LAC and PRC. We explore these issues with trade data for 1990-2002 (2003 data are not available for all relevant countries), analysing and comparing export performance and specialization patterns in the world as a whole and in the US, the main market for both. We do not undertake a detailed analysis of the competitiveness at the industrial or product level: this would require detailed empirical investigation of the main export actors, benchmarking of productivity and capabilities and comparisons of national costs and policies, well beyond our scope. Our paper is thus a preliminary mapping that may offer insights for further, more detailed exploration.
Section 2 discusses the notion of PRC's 'competitive threat' and out a schema for measuring PRC's competitive impact in third markets. Section 3 analyses the 'potential for competition' between LAC and PRC by comparing the structure of their exports in various ways. Section 4 assesses the competitive impact of PRC on LAC in world markets by comparing their relative market share changes in both the world and US markets over 1990-2002 by technology categories. Section 5 deals with bilateral trade between LAC and PRC. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix tables provide more detailed data.
The Chinese 'Competitive Threat'
The explosive growth of Chinese exports over the past decade has led to much discussion of its 'competitive threat' in developed as well as developing countries. At the popular level, the threat seems quite clear. Between 1990 and 2002, PRC's manufactured exports grew by 16.6% per annum, from $48 billion to $303.5 billion, 1 raising its world market share over three-fold from 1.9% to 6.4%. In 2002, PRC overtook the UK and in 2003 it overtook France, becoming the fourth largest exporter in the world after the US, Germany and Japan. In the developing world it was by far the largest exporter; its share of manufactured exports more than doubled (in a faster growing total), from 11.3% to 24.1%.
In response to falling trade costs and greater international capital mobility PRC has emerged as a major exporter at both the labour-intensive low technology and increasingly at the knowledge-intensive higher technology end of the product spectrum. For the former goods the large labour surplus in rural PRC has ensured a plentiful labour supply for the export sector at what has been a relatively constant real wage set by the low opportunity of rural labour. The consequence has been that a in wide range of activities PRC has been the marginal supplier of low technology goods to the world market and its productivity and wage level have set world prices for these goods. PRC's productivity has improved fast enough to offset increases in rural wages to ensure its competitiveness at the labour-intensive end of the spectrum. At the higher technology end export growth has been based on a combination of growing domestic capability and the activities of MNCs in relocating segments of the production chain to PRC take advantage of low labour costs. The key to PRC's further progress here will be in its own capability development. 1 All the trade data in this paper are in current US dollars and come from the UN Comtrade database. 2 For a discussion of the role of capabilities (defined simply in terms of a combination of cost and quality) in trade and of the process capability development see Sutton (2000) . By one simple measure of its development R and D expenditure per capita PRC has made great strides in recent years. In R&D, according the 2004 OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Scoreboard, PRC reached 1.1 per cent of GDP in 2002, up from 0.6 per cent in 1996; around 60 per cent of the R&D expenditure came from companies rather than the government. In
The sheer speed, magnitude and range of its export expansion raised worries that competing countries were losing their overseas markets and FDI inflows. Latin America as a more industrialized region than PRC (its manufactured value added per capita in 2000 was nearly double that of PRC, at $627 as compared with $350, UNIDO, 2004 ) is a potential competitor particularly in the US market. The most direct threat has been perceived to be in Mexico. For example, The Economist describes the Mexican problem succinctly "In the past two years it has become painfully clear that PRC is the favourite destination for the labour-intensive manufacturing that Mexico specialized in for the past three decades… The problem is simple. Labour costs in PRC, converted at the country's artificially low exchange rate, are about a quarter of the level in Mexico. The result: about 300 manufacturing plants have moved from Mexico to PRC in the past two years, reckons the Labour Ministry. Especially affected is electrical assembly. Those plants that stay have cut wages… Not only is Mexican labour being undercut, but so is its privileged access to the American market. PRC has joined the WTO, and the United States is negotiating a freetrade agreement with five Central American countries… Not surprisingly, Mexico is dropping steadily down the international league tables of competitiveness." ('Mexico's economy: the sucking sound from the East', London, July 24, 2003) 2.1 Some Refinements
The popular notion of 'competitive threat' comes from business, where companies compete with one another and a gain in share by one is necessarily a loss by another. Transposing this to the national level means that trade is also a zero-sum game where one country gains at the expense of another: the loss of markets thus means a loss of jobs, incomes and growth. To the economist, this approach is misleading. The loss of markets in one industry does not imply that the country as a whole is less competitive'. Countries trade with each other in a range of products and it is unclear what higher or lower competitiveness means for an economy as a whole. The US, for instance, is becoming 'less competitive' in making apparel and 'more competitive' in making computers, but is it meaningful that the US is becoming 'less' or 'more competitive'? Krugman (1994) argues that it is not. To him, "competitiveness is a meaningless word when applied to national economies. And the obsession with competitiveness is both wrong and dangerous" (p. 44). "International trade is not a zero-sum game" and treating it as such shows a lack of understanding of basic trade theory (p. 34). If all parties gain from specialising in trade, the entry of a new competitor can raise welfare for all partners -there is no 'competitive threat'.
Krugman uses the simple Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model to make his case. With efficient markets, perfect information, identical production functions across countries, no scale economies, no learning, full employment, fully mobile factors within economies, exogenous technical change, and all the other assumptions of static H-O models, all participants benefit from trade. The rise or fall of particular activities is irrelevant and the opening up of trade (or the entry of a new player) leads to a new equilibrium in which again all participants are better off. In this model, the pattern of specialization does not matter: since there are no externalities, innovation or differentiated products, all activities are equally beneficial and all factors yield equal returns on the margin. The size of the entrant and its rate of export growth also do not matter, since adjustment is instantaneous and costless.
terms of business enterprise R&D as a share of GDP, this takes PRC to fourth place in the developing world, after the Republic of Korea, Taipei,China and Singapore, and well ahead of other large economies like India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina or Indonesia.
In this model, PRC's entry induces other countries to move along their production possibility frontier and reach a higher social indifference curve, without friction, cost or delays, and with full employment throughout. While the extent of adjustment required is particularly large because of PRC's size, as long as markets are efficient there cannot be a 'competitive threat' (that reduces welfare). On the contrary, PRC's size opens up greater possibilities for new specialization (in higher wage economies in more capital and skill-intensive activities) and so larger welfare gains (though there are distributional consequences as resources move across activities with different factor intensities). The policy implications are simplegovernments should not delay or prevent the adjustment but should permit free trade.
Does this dispose of the 'competitive threat'? Unfortunately not: the result depends crucially on the assumptions of the canonical H-O model. If these assumptions are relaxed to allow for greater realism -scale economies, differentiated products, adjustment lags, uncertainty, technological gaps, externalities and agglomeration effects, endogenous technical change, cumulative learning, information failures, unemployment, immobile factors domestically and mobile ones abroad, large firms with market power, and so on -the outcome can be quite different. There remain benefits from specialization and trade remains a non-zero sum game, but the realisation of the benefits in imperfect markets depends on the ability of each economy to create (or attract) competitive capabilities and to move into activities that offer the best opportunities for growth, technological development and spillover benefits (here the structure of comparative advantage does matter).
Alternative perspectives on international trade to the simple H-O model help to clarify the adjustment problem. For example, the new 'economic geography literature' (ironically also associated with Krugman, as for example in Krugman 1998) views trade through models where increasing returns to scale, learning and externalities have an important role. This alternative type of trade model predicts strong tendencies to geographical concentration and clustering with cumulative gains. International dispersal of activities like manufacturing (but the arguments apply to any increasing returns sector) requires either large cost increases in established production centres (for example due to rising wages or congestion costs) or major falls in trade costs.
Recent globalization trends can be interpreted as a process of falling trade costs where these include not just transport costs and import tariffs or tariff equivalents, but also the less obvious time costs of goods in transit, search costs as trading partners search each other out, control and management cost in organizing a supply chain internationally and unofficial policy barriers, including unofficial payments. Falls in trade cost, in fact, have been shown empirically to have a relatively large impact on trade flows. In the 1990s, PRC, with its large labour surplus and increasing outward policy orientation and openness to FDI, was well placed to take advantage of these cost decreases.
The prediction of these models is that the de-concentration process will itself be highly inequitable and a limited number of new dispersed production centres will emerge (Puga and Venables, 1996) . Hence economies that lack the flexibility to move quickly into increasing return activities may find that once producers in rival economies become established the process of catch-up may be lengthy and difficult. From this perspective the rise of the first and second tier Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), in part the result of FDI flows from the older established producer Japan, represents one of stage industrial dispersal, with rapid growth in PRC, also strongly influenced by FDI flows in part from the NIEs themselves, a more recent dispersal stage. The question at hand therefore is what are the implications of this more recent dispersal of production for economies in Latin America?
For an economy or group of economies (like LAC) the current process of falling trade costs and its impact on their relations with PRC can be considered from the conventional perspective of trade diversion (if they lose market share to lower cost or higher quality Chinese goods) and trade creation (as markets are created by impact of PRC on both world trade and LAC exports). If the first effect has negative effects, provided resources are flexible, the conventional H-O analysis indicates the second should be sufficiently strong for all to benefit, at least potentially. 3 However if one accepts that the trade (and production) structure of an economy matters for long-run growth due to the power of increasing returns, externalities and so forth, alternative trade models caution against this simple conclusion.
In addition, analysis that focuses on the technology structure of trade suggests that the move up the technology ladder is not automatic (in response to changing factor prices) but is dependent on many factors including the policy environment (such as targeting of hi-tech FDI, creation of high level specialized skills, promotion of R&D and so on). It is also seen as path-dependent, cumulative and gradual, so that countries can go on diverging over time with no inbuilt tendency to gravitate to some universal norm. (Lall 2001 ) A more technologyintensive export structure is also more dynamic as across industries there is a trend over time for technology-intensive activities to grow faster in trade. In part this reflects the faster growth in production and demand of innovative products. In part it also reflects the tendency for some high-technology products to relocate to developing countries to take advantage of low labour costs; the high value-to-weight ratio of these HT products makes them particularly suited to such fragmentation (Lall, Albaladejo and Zhang, 2004) .
In this more realistic world, the entry of a large, efficient low-wage competitor like PRC into new export markets can involve significant adjustment costs and, where full and rapid adjustment is not attained, can lead to welfare losses. The outcome depends on two factors:
• The similarity of export structures in the competing countries, with greater similarity calling for greater adjustments on the part of the established producers.
• The speed, cost, nature and extent of adjustment in each country. These depend on the efficiency of existing markets and institutions in each country (and access to foreign capabilities), which in turn depend on the efficiency of policy to overcome market and institutional failures where they exist.
4 examine the problems of economies in East Asia (EA) adjusting to competition from PRC. LAC has two advantages over EA: greater economic distance from PRC and more different export structures (with more inter-industry complementarities). While there are industries in which LAC faces direct and intense competition from PRC -the most obvious examples are electronics in Mexico and apparel in Mexico and Central America -LAC should, in general, face lower adjustment costs and benefit more from bilateral trade with PRC.
At the same time, no LAC economy comes near the mature EA NIEs (Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China) in terms of industrial capabilities, 5 though there are pockets of advanced capabilities in the larger economies, like automobiles, pharmaceuticals and aircraft (in Brazil). In general, however, the opportunities for LAC 'keeping ahead' of PRC in terms of the product complexity are narrower. Certainly, none has the possibility of relocating industrial activities in PRC to take advantage of its lower costs. Where they 3 Macro models for recent trade developments following PRC's WTO accession assume away adjustment problems and predict strong trade creation so that all partners gain form trade liberalization and PRC's growth; see for example Roland-Holst (2002) and Weiss (2004) . 4 Countries may also suffer because Chinese imports raise world prices for primary and intermediate products. We ignore this and other price effects in this paper, as we do not deal with unit price data (these are only available for a small set of traded products). However, the risk of PRC raising primary product prices is very real, and attracting considerable media attention.
5 See Lall, Albaladejo and Moreira (2004) .
compete directly, therefore, it is more likely that LAC will find it more difficult to keep ahead of PRC. Moreover, the intra-industry or vertical 'sharing' of export activity happening in EA is much less feasible between LAC and PRC. Not only does economic distance place a barrier, the two main industries in which such sharing occurs, automobiles and electronics, have limited potential for intra-industry trade between LAC and PRC. PRC is not a major auto exporter and products are too 'heavy' (in terms of value to weight ratios) to make such longdistance interchange feasible. 6 In electronics, PRC is a major player and products are light enough to permit trans-continental production sharing (many hi-tech components originate in the US). The major electronics exporter in Latin America, Mexico, has been losing exports and jobs to PRC, although as we see later there are in fact some signs of intra-industry trade, and the net longer-term trend is unclear.
LAC may face a more serious threat over the long term: the export specialization of most countries is heavily biased towards resource-based and primary products. It is not geared to dynamic categories in world trade and offers few technological or skill benefits. Chinese growth may well constrain their future ability to diversify into more dynamic, technologyintensive products, and so downgrade their potential comparative advantage. While we cannot analyse this possibility with past trade data, we can gauge from past trends the direction in which the region is heading, particularly in bilateral trade.
Measuring the Competitive Threat
There is no accepted methodology for quantifying a 'competitive threat' with the type of data available here. In the business literature, the common measure of competitive performance is relative market shares, and we start with this: in the simplest case, there is a competitive threat if PRC gains export market share and the other country loses. The intensity of the threat is given by the extent of the relative change. We look at competitiveness both in world markets and in the main market for LAC, the US.
However, such market share data do not show how LAC and PRC actually interact with each other at the product level. While it is not possible to infer direct causal relationships for the competitive impact of Chinese entry (only detailed fieldwork can show such relationships), it is possible make some progress by examining combinations of market share changes for PRC and neighbours. Using the technique in , we distinguish five outcomes (Table 1 ) and quantify the exports that fall under each over time. caveats in each indicator. For instance, the data may suggest a 'partial threat' where PRC is raising market share faster than the other country (i.e. in PRC's absence, given that the other country is competitive, its share may have risen faster). However, it is possible that PRC is helping the other country to compete better by complementing it within an integrated production network and so preventing its market share from doing even less well. This may be plausible for EA economies in some sectors but is much less so for LAC. In the 'direct threat' PRC gains and the other country loses market share. Within EA, this may be compatible with the losing country placing export facilities in PRC and so extending its competitive advantage (this is the case with textiles and clothing and some electronics). For the PRC-LAC interaction this pattern is highly unlikely, so that a 'direct threat' is unambiguously negative and the share of the direct threat category in an economy's total exports is our preferred measure of threat.
We examine the potential for competition between LAC and PRC by measuring the similarity of their export structures over time. This is done at several levels:
1. At the broad technological level, we examine the overlap between PRC and LAC in primary product and four technological categories of manufactured exports: RB (resource based), LT (low technology), MT (medium technology) and HT (high technology) (see Table 2 ). These four categories for manufactures are further disaggregated into nine sub-categories, capturing different technological or structural features, for further analysis. This technology classification offers several other benefits. It allows us to gauge the basis of each country's comparative advantage and its evolution over time. It shows how the country is 'positioned' to benefit from innovation and from changes in global trade patterns and it provides an indicator of whether the country will move up or down the technology ladder as a result of the competitive interaction with PRC. 2. We use another broad level of classification, this time in terms of product 'sophistication'. We group all exports into categories of sophistication according to the average income of the exporter of the product in world markets, hypothesising that a 'rich man's export' has certain characteristics of interest, such as greater differentiation and branding, better design and specifications, and more advanced technology. This allows us to compare goods within one of the given technology classifications. 3. At the more detailed product level, we examine the statistical correlation between the export structures of PRC and LAC. Higher correlation indicates greater potential for direct competition and rising correlations over time show that this potential is growing. 7 The technology classification is explained in detail in Lall (2000) and has been used in a number of recent studies on trade. One difficulty in applying this classification to trade is that the data do not distinguish between different processes in making a given product. A high technology product like semiconductors may in fact simply be based on low technology assembly and in the trade data its exports appear as high-tech. There is no way to overcome this problem; the only way to proceed is to apply the categories and then qualify the results with other evidence on the technological content of local production. A related problem is that at this level of aggregation it is not possible to distinguish between products in the same industry with very different technological and other features. Some low technology industries may have very complex and innovative products within them and some high technology ones may cover relatively simple and mature products. [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] . The countries are divided into the following groups:
• LAC: All the 18 countries below taken together
• LAC-M: LAC excluding Mexico because Mexico becomes an outlier after 1995 when it joins NAFTA
• LAC Big 3: The 'big three' are Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.
• LAC Big 2: Argentina and Brazil only, again to exclude the outlier Mexico.
• LAC Medium 4: The 'medium four' are Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela
• LAC Small 11: The 'small 11' are Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay.
• LAC S 10: The 'small 10', S11 excluding Costa Rica because its Intel plant in the late 1990s, and resulting high technology exports, make it an outlier in the group.
The technology classification used is shown in Table 2 . This section considers LAC's 'potential for competition' with PRC in terms of exports to third markets, starting with the similarity of structures; the hypothesis is simply that the greater the similarity in export structures, the greater the potential threat from PRC -given its lower wages and faster expansion. Table 4 shows the distribution of regional exports by technology. 
Technological Structure of Exports
In general when this type of breakdown is undertaken, most observers conclude that this export structure is unfavourable to the growth prospects of LAC, particularly relative to EA, as LAC has a much more limited focus on technologically sophisticated goods with dynamic market prospects. 10 Within LAC, over the period Mexico (like PRC) shows a sharp decline in the share of primary and RB products. Mexico also behaves similarly to PRC in terms of the growing share of HT, but has a much lower share for LT products, counter-balanced by a higher MT share. The big 2, medium 4 and small 11 LAC economies all have high shares of primary and RB exports, with the larger economies having proportionately more MT exports. At the more disaggregated technology level, the highest reliance on mineral-based RB exports is in the Medium 4 (the impact of oil in Venezuela). Fashion cluster exports are relatively important for the Small 11, due to US outsourcing of apparel in the Caribbean and Central America (this will come under severe competitive threat from PRC after the end of the Multi Fibre Agreement at the end of 2004). MT process industries are significant for the Big 2 and the Medium 4, while auto products are most significant for Mexico and the Big 2. MT engineering exports are very significant in Mexico but not in other LAC economies; electronics are also large in Mexico and (because of Costa Rica) in the Small 11. Other HT exports are significant only in the Big 2.
PRC has a very different technological trade pattern from most of LAC. As noted, Mexico is only country that comes near it, but it still has significant differences. PRC has a much larger role for fashion cluster products and electronics, but a much smaller one for automotives. However, their growing similarity is particularly relevant, and we have noted the mounting Chinese threat to simple labour-intensive jobs in the Mexican maquilas.
These technology comparisons are fairly aggregate but they do suggest that Chinese exports do not pose a direct threat to the bulk of LAC exports, with some exceptions:
• Fashion products (of interest to the smaller economies and Mexico),
• 'Other LT' (this is a broad category but PRC may be posing a threat in specific products like toys, sports goods or travel goods that are exported by the smaller economies),
• Engineering products, where PRC is now a major exporter of machinery and consumer durables and may affect similar exports from Mexico and possibly Brazil. However their relative weight will raise transport costs and may reduce their competitiveness in markets to which LAC countries sell.
• Electronics, of export interest mainly to Mexico and Costa Rica.
Of course, these categories should be disaggregated to yield meaningful conclusions at the product and country level.
11
11 For a disaggregated analysis of RB exports see Chami (2003) , who finds that 'differentiated' RB products are highly dynamic and that economies like Chile that specialised in them did much better in US markets than countries that exported undifferentiated RB products. He also conducts a more general comparison of LAC and East Asia and finds that, "Generally speaking, exporter countries with a low share of resource-based products in total exports tended to perform better in the last decade than those with high shares. Within Latin America, Mexico and Costa Rica with low shares of resource-based exports performed relatively well, while Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela, with high shares of resource-based exports, did not do very well." (p. 20)
Product Structure
The similarity of export structures between LAC and PRC can be examined by product category (here we look at the 3 digit level for 181 products, excluding 'special transactions') without categorising them by technology. We start with the stability of export structures in each country, the correlation between export patterns in 1990 and 2002. A high coefficient shows that the export composition is relatively unchanging, while a low coefficient indicates structural change.
The more changeable structures are in PRC and Mexico (roughly correlation coefficients of 0.4 and 0.6 respectively) the least are the LAC Medium 4 and LAC without Mexico (correlation coefficients of over 0.9). It may be expected that more rapid structural changeif it allows the exporter to respond to shifting structures in world trade -will lead to faster growth. Thus is borne out by the data since a regression of the stability coefficients on export growth rates over 1990-2002 for our sample countries in LAC and PRC supports this expectation. The adjusted R-square is 0.31 (F=11.2) and the coefficient is negative and significant -0.022 (t=-3.35). The high degree of stability in export structure in LAC, along with a specialisation in non-dynamic products, appears to be taking a toll in the growth of export earnings.
We now compare the export structures of individual LAC countries with PRC. For all products, Chinese exports overlap significantly only with Mexico and Costa Rica, and even here the correlation coefficient is relatively low (at only 0.47 and 0.27 respectively). Thereafter there is a huge drop in the coefficient, and all other LAC countries have almost no correlation with Chinese exports. As a comparison, PRC's export structure and that of the main producers in EA has a correlation coefficient of 0.75 for 2002 .
Taking manufactured products only, there is a fairly dramatic decline over time in the similarity of Chinese exports with most of LAC, due to the rapid structural shifts in the latter. Table 1 gives the export structure correlation coefficients for PRC and all the LAC countries.
'Sophistication' Structure
Another way of analysing export structure and similarity is the 'sophistication' of manufactured exports based on average income level of the exporter of each product: the higher the level the more sophisticated the product. 'Sophistication' captures technological and other product characteristics based on the location of export production: a product exported by richer countries has features that allow relatively high wage economies to compete and are (in the relevant period) out of reach of lower wage economies. For a given product, greater sophistication presumably embodies higher levels of processing and greater value added; the inability to raise sophistication with rising wages leads to the loss of competitive advantage.
As a simple comparison we calculate an average sophistication score for each country based on the scores of each of its products. 12 Table 5 shows the score for 1990 and 2000 for PRC, some of the countries in LAC and EA, along with some developed and poorer countries for comparison.
The industrialized countries are, expectedly, at the top, with the US in the lead. Each has a decline in its sophistication score over the 1990s, reflecting the shift in exports to lower wage countries. In fact, most countries, including developing ones, see a decline in their scores for this reason. Note that Ireland, a relative newcomer to the industrial world with a strong specialisation in (MNC driven) electronics, comes much lower (after PRC) for this reason.
Mexico comes just after Singapore, with a higher score than the two larger NIEs (Taipei,China and Korea) because of its concentration on autos, which has a higher sophistication score than electronics (the production of autos remains more a privilege of rich countries than electronics). The larger LAC economies, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina are in fact considerably closer to the EA NIEs than they are to PRC by this indicator.
The most helpful role for the sophistication index is likely to be in distinguishing different types of products within broad categories. The technology categories in table 4 for example may contain a range of products of differing quality, subject to different marketing strategies and undergoing different degrees of processing and technology development. In such instances the index provides a simple way of differentiating within these broad technology categories. 12 The share of each manufactured product in a country's total manufactured exports is multiplied by the sophistication score of that product (in world trade); the figure is then totalled across all products. Table 6 gives the average sophistication score within some important product categories for PRC and the LAC groupings, with Mexico shown separately. The sophistication scores capture several factors and do not, as they stand, point to direct competitive effects within these broad categories. However it is interesting to note that despite its lower score for its total exports and the important category of textiles and clothing, PRC has higher sophistication scores that LAC and Mexico for automobiles and metalworking machinery (where its score is very high), as well as for instruments and industrial chemicals. Its very high scores may be due to a division of the supply chain by MNCs, which concentrate relatively sophisticated activities (that those normally carried out in developed economies) in PRC. For the important category of electronics the sophistication scores for PRC, LAC and Mexico are similar. Hence for the two largest product categories in terms of export value, textiles and clothing and electronics, the sophistication scores for PRC are either below or broadly similar to the scores for its LAC trading partners.
Competitive Impact on LAC in World Markets
We now turn to the five-fold matrix of competitive effects of PRC on LAC economies, starting with exports to world markets and then considering the US market alone (see table 1 for definitions of the 'threat' categories). We work at the 3-digit SITC level and over the period 1990-2002 calculate changes in world market share (WMS) based on a comparison growth rates for LAC countries and PRC. For the two years 1990 and 2002 we show the proportions of trade that taken by the five 'threat categories.'
As noted earlier, these calculations can only be suggestive -they cannot prove causationbut nonetheless they are plausible and interesting. (Table 7) ; there is also a shift in the composition of the threat, from direct to partial. Recall that the direct threat is where a country loses WMS and PRC gains and by this measure the intensify of the Chinese threat decreases significantly over time (this is also true of EA, although there the degree of threat is much higher with on, an unweighted basis, 75% of exports under some form of threat; (see .
13 By our direct threat measure in 2002 on 11% of LAC exports are in this category. 13 The unweighted average for threatened exports in EA of 75 % is much higher than LAC's unweighted average of 47%. The highest figures for LAC are 75% for Costa Rica and 71% for El Salvador, while in EA they are 98% for Hong Kong, China and 85% for Malaysia. The lowest figure in LAC is 16% for Venezuela, while in EA it is 50% for Indonesia. Figure 1 shows the share of 'threatened exports' booth direct and partial in the two years, ranked by the total threat in 2002. The least threatened is Venezuela (less than 20% of exports), shielded by its heavy dependence on oil-based exports. The countries with the largest reduction in the competitive threat in these two categories are Paraguay, Peru and Argentina: all countries that have moved over time into primary or RB products where PRC does not have a strong competitive position or into products like automobiles where PRC is not yet a significant exporter. Countries like Guatemala and Colombia appear to place PRC under threat, because they gain market share in primary products where PRC is a small exporter and is losing market share. The most 'threatened' countries in LAC in total are Costa Rica, El Salvador and Chile (over 70% of total exports are under threat for the first two countries and around 60% in the case of Chile). While the presence of Chile as a highly threatened country may appear surprising, it reflects the large share of its exports in copper, where PRC gains WMS while Chile loses. Its large exports of fish appear partially threatened because PRC gains more WMS than it does. In Costa Rica the Chinese threat is overwhelmingly partial, with PRC gaining WMS in electronics, instruments, apparel and processed food exports. In El Salvador, it reflects a direct and partial threat in the textile and clothing industry. In terms of the more serious category 'direct threat' all countries see a decline as a share of their exports 1990-2002 and seven (Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) have less than 10% of their exports in this category in 2002. In terms of direct threat the most threatened are now Chile, Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay and Colombia) all with more than 20% of their exports in this category (see Appendix Table 4 for details of the main products involved).
While earlier export structure comparisons show that Mexico faces the greatest potential threat from PRC, this calculation shows that because of its very rapid gains in WMS it has not actually faced a significant threat over [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] We test in what type of product Latin America countries are losing market share most rapidly by a simple correlation analysis. At the 3 digit SITC level we correlate relative change in market share 1990-2002 (the growth of PRC exports minus the growth of Latin American exports) with firstly the growth of world exports for the product concerned and secondly with the degree of specialization of Latin American exporters (as measured by the revealed comparative advantage ratio, RCA). We carry out this correlation analysis for LAC as a group and for individual countries. For all countries we find the loss of market share to PRC is greatest in the fastest growing categories. For LAC as a group the correlation coefficient although relatively low (0.16) is significant at the 1% level. For Mexico the correlation is higher (0.32) and again strongly significant. As far the degree of specialization is concerned there is some evidence that LAC has held its position better in its more specialized product lines. The correlation coefficient between RCA in 2002 and relative export growth is negative and significant at the 1% for LAC as a group (-0.19 ) and for Mexico (-0.24) but not for many other individual countries. It also does not hold if we take specialization at the beginning of the period, that is the RCA for 1990.
These results suggest that while potential for a competitive threat exists, LAC faces a significantly smaller threat overall than EA for two reasons. First, export structures as compared with PRC differ far more, and second, structural similarities that do exist have yet to translate into a genuine market share challenge. This evidenced by the fact that if for 2002 one ranks LAC countries by the correlation coefficient of their total export structure with that of PRC and compares this ranking with that by the degree of direct threat (the direct threat category as a share of total exports) there is a significant negative correlation. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is -0.504 (significant at the 1% level). In other words, the countries with the more similar export structure show lower degrees of export threat. The clearest example is Mexico, the LAC country with the greatest similarity, which has been growing sufficiently rapidly over the 1990s to avoid a loss of WMS to PRC. However, it remains to be seen whether this will continue to be the case.
We now conduct a similar competitive impact exercise for the US market (Table 8) . 14 PRC had a share of US imports of 12% in 2002 compared with just 3% in 1990. Its gain in US market share over [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] 8 percentage points, was nearly double of that of LAC 18 (note that LAC-M lost market share in the US in this period, almost entirely in RB products). Latin America as a whole (LAC-18) had a share of 17% in 2002, but of this 11% is due to Mexico alone. PRC accounts for about double US imports of LT products as compared to LAC 18 and for almost as much of HT imports. By 2002, it overtook Mexico in HT products (it lagged in 2000) and almost matched it in RB products. For the US market Appendix Tables  5 to 7 give the value of the threat by each category for each LAC country and the five main products in each.
14 The competitive impact calculations below are carried out on the basis of export figures for each country to the US (with market shares based on world exports to the US) rather than on import figures into the US. We used the export figures to make these results comparable with the previous world market exercise. A calculation with US import data may well yield slightly different results.
In comparison with the analysis of the world market there are similarities as well as differences (Figures 1 and 2) . In terms of total threat (direct plus partial) Venezuela continues to be the least threatened country in LAC in both exercises. However, in 2002 Paraguay appears as the most threatened country in the US as compared to Costa Rica in the world as a whole, which now appears about half-way in the threat ranks. Mexico appears even less threatened than in world markets, while Brazil appears somewhat more threatened. Argentina also moves up the threat ranks. When we carry out a similar correlation analysis to that for the world market we find there is a tendency for the growth of PRC's exports relative to those of individual LAC to be higher in the faster growing categories of US imports, however this result is not significant for LAC as a group nor for Mexico. For LAC-Mex there is a weak correlation of 0.15 (at the 5% level). The deficits are all in non-resource based products: in 2002, primary products and RB manufactures show a surplus of $2.3 and $1.0 billion, respectively. However, these are offset by much larger deficits in manufactures: LT products ($3.0 billion), MT products (2.8 billion) and HT MT products ($3.0 billion). This illustrates clearly the structural shift in the pattern of competitiveness in LAC towards resource-based products and away from both simple low technology manufactures and more complex (medium and high technology) products. Table 9 shows the percentage breakdowns of the two regions' exports to each other by technological sub-categories. There has been a rapid structural transformation of LAC's trade pattern with PRC in the course of a relatively few years.
At the sub-category level, for exports by LAC to PRC there is a rise in the share of mineralbased RB, a sharp decline in that of MT process exports and the significant rise in the share of HT electronics products. PRC's exports to LAC are predominantly LT products, but their share appears to have peaked, and recent growth is largely, again, in HT electronics products. The growth of electronics exports by both regions suggests the start of a similar intra-industry specialisation as observed in EA; as noted below, it is largely confined to Mexico and may reflect the emergence of an integrated MNC-driven network across the regions. If one looks within the LAC figures at the technology composition of bilateral trade between the LAC Big 3 (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) and PRC different patterns emerge (see Appendix  Table 8 ). Argentina is overwhelmingly an exporter of primary products, with its share of RB products declining significantly. It has no noticeable exports of HT products to PRC. Its imports from PRC are predominantly LT products, but with large and growing shares of MT and HT products. Argentina runs a trade surplus with PRC, $763 m. In 2002, most of it, expectedly, was in primary products, with a smaller surplus in agro-based RB products. It ran a deficit in mineral-based RB products.
Brazil also raises its exports of primary products but maintains a very large share for RB products. It has a small but growing share for HT products but a sharply falling one for MT products. PRC's exports to Brazil span the five categories, with all the manufactured categories growing at the expense of primary products. The largest category by far is HT products. Brazil also runs a trade surplus with PRC, $823 m., mostly in primary products and RB manufactures (both mineral and agro-based products). Its largest deficit is in HT products, followed by MT engineering products. As a major exporter of other LT products (footwear), it is interesting to see a large and growing deficit in both LT categories (bearing out reports of a massive threat to its footwear exporters).
Mexico exports hardly any primary or resource-based products to PRC, a surprising contrast to the rest of LAC. Over time it makes a massive shift from MT to HT products. Chinese exports to Mexico also have HT as the largest category, but along with very large shares of MT and LT products. However, the values of Mexican HT exports to PRC are far smaller than Chinese HT exports to Mexico. In 2002, for instance, the figures are $320 million and $2.1 billion, respectively. Overall, Mexico runs a huge $5.7 billion trade deficit with PRC. It also runs a deficit with PRC in every single category of trade, possibly reflecting the import of components for assembly for the US market by MNCs from Japan and other countries.
In summary, a new pattern of specialization is emerging in LAC-PRC bilateral trade with the former region a net exporter of primary and resource-base products and a net importer of 
Conclusions
The idea of an economy facing a competitive threat has been much discussed and in a world of instant adjustment, trade diversion as an economy's market share is taken by a lower cost or higher quality competitor will pose no problems. In practice we have argued that once a whole range of real world considerations are introduced growth can be cumulative and export success in dynamic products with strong learning externalities can place an economy on a higher growth path than a concentration on an alternative set of 'simpler' export goods. The current trading environment is characterized not just by a lowering of tariff barriers through the WTO, but also by major reductions in transport and communications costs leading to a fall in 'trade cost' more broadly. In this situation the rise of PRC is important both because its size and rapid growth suggest important trade creation effects as it provides an expanding markets for others, and because it is becomingly increasing competitive in a wide range of goods in both low and high technology categories.
Latin America is still somewhat distant from this process. Some countries are benefiting from growing imports of primary and RB products by PRC, although in general PRC remains a relatively small market for LAC, although as an import supplier PRC has just overtook Japan in 2003. The trade structure of most of LAC is generally more complementary than competitive with that of PRC. The exceptions are principally Mexico and Costa Rica, that similar to PRC, are closely integrated into production networks of MNCs. With a differing export structure the likelihood of damaging trade diversion effects is weakened.
Our analysis has provided a simple framework for classifying trade data on the basis of 'competitive threats'. In general the threatened (direct plus partial) category at just below 40% of all trade is well below a comparable figure for EA. Goods in the more serious direct threat category are only 10% of total trade. Interestingly the two LAC economies with the most similar export structure, Mexico and Costa Rica, have very low shares of trade in the direct threat categories (2% and 6%, respectively) although the shares in the partial threat groups are far higher (32% and 69%, respectively). When the US market alone is considered the direct threat groups remain small and now the partial threat share is also much lower (8% for Mexico and 33% for Costa Rica), reflecting rapid export growth from these economies to the US up to 2002.
We should stress some caveats to our basic results on competitive threats. Apart from the problems in attributing causation to these relationships, we emphasise that the past may not be a good guide to the future, particularly as far as the rather sanguine result for Mexico goes. Ironically the long-time suspicion of export-oriented FDI in Latin America may prove relevant here, if in the face of falling trade costs that lower the disadvantage of distant production locations, MNCs decide to shift from bases in Mexico and Central America to take advantage of lower labour costs in PRC. It is this process, at least as much as competition from exports from PRC, that produces the real challenge to policy makers in Mexico in serving the US market.
Our analysis of bilateral trade between LAC and PRC reveals a striking tendency towards a pattern of specialization with LAC a net exporter of primary products and a net importer of manufactures. The patterns of the two regions are almost a classic textbook illustration of trade between developing and industrialized regions, where the former (i.e. LAC) strengthens its specialisation in primary products and processes resources while the latter (i.e. PRC) does the reverse. What is surprising is that LAC is the richer region, with a longer history of modern industrialization, higher human resources, more FDI per capita and with more liberal trade and investment regimes. The result is arguably a massive downgrading of comparative advantage in a dynamic sense, surprising for such a relatively industrialized region.
The non-threatened LAC countries -which have such different specialisations that they do not face Chinese competition in the US or elsewhere -may nonetheless face a serious threat to their long-term development. A heavy reliance on primary and resource-based products is not conducive to a dynamic comparative advantage or technological upgrading, yet any such upgrading may well face a strong competitive threat from PRC because the kinds of products they may feasibly move into are already 'taken' by PRC. The issue is then much less about current competition, but more about the future 'spaces' open for the development of industrial exports in a liberalised world in which PRC is pre-empting many markets for products that developing countries can export. LAC will remain a high wage location relative to PRC for the foreseeable future and it will require h high levels of skill or technological competence to offset this.
This point about patterns of specialization and levels of skill and technological competence raises more general issues concerning LAC's competitive position in the world economy, its institutional structure and apart from Mexico and some Central American economies, its relatively weak positioning in global production networks (see Lall, Albaladejo and Moreira 2004). These are not problems created by the 'rise of PRC' but the substantial global trade diversion and trade creation resulting from PRC's rapid expansion are creating new challenges and hence making it more urgent to address these longer-term issues.
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